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ABSTRACT 
Calculations  are presented to support the  claim 
that fast neutron detection systems can achieve 
higher performance  in detecting weak neutron 
sources than conventional thermal neutron 
detection systems involving moderators. 
Minimum Detectable  Limits (MDL) are  used as a 
comparative metric, more  representative  than the 
metric of absolute  sensitivity, which does not take 
into account the influence  of natural backgrounds. 
Monte  Carlo simulations are  used to show that 
heavily shielded neutron sources emit a 
substantial fraction of fast neutrons. Arguments 
are presented to support the  claim that fast 
neutron detection systems are superior at 
defeating heavy neutron shielding than thermal 
systems.
INTRODUCTION
Neutron  detection  in passive screening 
applications has in  the past  been carried out 
primarily  by  means of thermal neutron 
detectors,  mostly  using  devices involving  3He. 
This approach  was justified by  the high 
detection  efficiency  over  large areas achievable 
u s i n g t h e r m a l n e u t r o n  d e t e c t o r s i n 
conjunction with  a  moderator. Following  the 
assumption that sources surrounded by 
shielding  emit substantial fractions of slow 
neutrons, resorting  exclusively  to thermal 
neutron detection appeared fully justified.
Since the industry  has been  confronted 
with  a  shortage of 3He in  the past few  years, 
the search  for  adequate replacement 
technology  has ensued. For  the purpose of 
e v a l u a t i n g  c a n d i d a t e r e p l a c e m e n t 
technologies,  a  performance metric relating  to 
a  system’s sensitivity  was instated.  The 
metric,  referred to as absolute sensitivity  or 
cps/ng throughout this note, measures the 
number  of counts per  second (cps) a  given 
neutron detection  system  registers when a 
252Cf source of 1  ng  is placed in  a  defined 
configuration  at a  standoff of 2  m  from  the 
system. 1  In this paper, the described 
configuration  of 1  ng of 252Cf is assumed to 
expose a  detector  at  2  m  standoff to 0.006 
ΜSv/h  of neutron radiation. This paper 
presents arguments that suggest the metric of 
absolute sensitivity  be replaced by  the more 
representative metric of Minimum  Detectable 
Limits (MDL). 
The performance of fast  neutron detector 
s y s t e m s i s e v a l u a t e d u s i n g  M D L , 
demonstrat ing  superior  performance 
potential.  The impact of shielding on  the 
fractional  fast neutron  population is studied, 
indicating that configurations of heavily 
shielded sources may  elude detection  by 
thermal neutron  systems while remaining 
detectable by  fast neutron systems.  A 
technology  with the potential to fulfill  such  a 
task is briefly reviewed.
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NATURAL 
NEUTRON BACKGROUND
Dependence of Background
The natural neutron  background has a  1/E 
energy  dependence,  as can  be seen  from  the 
work  of R.T. Krouzes et  al.2  Accordingly,  the 
background of lower  energy  neutrons is 
substantially  more intense than  the fast 
neutron  background.  Thermal neutron 
detection  systems using  moderators are 
particularly  sensitive to this background. Fast 
neutron detectors can  reject  the vast  majority 
of background by  focusing on  the energy  of 
interest from  ~500  keV  to ~8  MeV  in  which 
the fission  sources emit  most of their 
neutrons.
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Threshold Computation
The detection  of background neutrons is a 
statistical process subject to fluctuations. In 
passive screening  applications,  a  threshold is 
set,  defining the value above which  an  alarm  is 
triggered. The closer  the threshold value is to 
the average background value, the higher  the 
sensitivity  of the system, and the higher the 
expected False Alarm  Rate (FAR)  from 
fluctuations.  Setting  a  threshold significantly 
above the expected neutron background 
reduces both  the sensitivity  of the system  and 
its susceptibility  to false alarms.  It will be 
shown in  this subsection,  that  fast  neutron 
detectors,  being  less susceptible to background 
neutrons,  can operate  at  significantly  lower 
thresholds than  thermal  neutron  systems. 
Blessinger  and York   present  a  method based 
on  Poissonian statistics to set  the threshold of 
a  system  for  a  given FAR probability 
requirement  P and a  background Μ a  system 
will detect during  a measurement,  with  the 
prediction  of Μ  based on  a  background rate 
measurement. 3  According  to the method,  the 
correct threshold k  is the lowest  integer  for 
which y<P, where
                      (1)
MINIMUM DETECTABLE LIMIT (MDL) 
COMPUTATION
Once the correct  threshold has been 
ascertained for  a  given  background Μ and FAR 
requirement  P, the Minimum  Detectable Limit 
(MDL),  defined as the radiation quantity 
sufficient to reach  the threshold (triggering  an 
alarm  with  a  50% probability),  can  be 
calculated using  the systems sensitivity  s  (in 
units of cps/ΜSv/h),  and the measurement 
time t: 
            (2)
In  the calculations presented in this note, 
measurements are assumed to be of the “wait-
in”  type,  meaning,  the source is at  rest  during 
the measurement,  which  is carried out in  a 
defined time window t.
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Assumptions
In  the following a  performance comparison 
using  the formulae (1) and (2) above will be 
made.  As a  basis for  the calculation,  a 
hypothetical thermal neutron  detection  system 
(System  T) will  have a  sensitivity  of st=417 
cps/ΜSv/h, corresponding  to the minimum 
requirement of 2.5  cps/ng for  a  neutron 
detection  panel  in  a  Radiation  Portal Monitor 
(RPM). 4  The system  is further  assumed to 
measure an  average neutron background of 3 
cps.5
Table I.  Neutron Detection System Specifications 
Used for Comparison
Thermal Neutron 
Detector System
Fast Neutron 
Detector 
System
Absolute 
sensitivity
s=417 cps/µSv/h 
(2.5 cps/ng)
s=150 cps/
µSv/h 
(0.9 cps/ng)
Background count 
rate of system
3 cps 0.06 cps
Background 
counts during t=10 
s measurement 
window
µt=30 neutron 
background
µf=0.6 
neutron 
background
Alarm threshold 
for t=10 s 
measurement 
window [3]
kt=54 neutrons 
(compatible with 
FAR<5 10-5) 
kt=61 neutrons 
(compatible with 
FAR<5 10-7)
kf=6 neutrons 
(compatible 
with FAR<4
10-5) 
kf=8 neutrons 
(compatible 
with FAR<3
10-7)
Minimum 
Detectable Limit 
(MDL)
0.0074 µSv/h 
(compatible with 
FAR<5 10-7)
0.0049 µSv/h
(compatible 
with FAR<3
10-7)
The fast neutron  detection  system  (System 
F)  used for comparison  is assumed to have a 
sensitivity  of sf=150 cps/ΜSv/h  (0.9  cps/ng). 
Although  this value is below  the 2.5  cps/ng 
requirement  of Kouzes and others,6  it will  be 
shown that  this system  is capable of detecting 
weaker  sources than System  T, and thus has 
higher  performance. System  F is assumed to 
detect  background neutrons at  an average rate 
of 0.06  cps.  The sensitivity  and background 
values of 150 cps/ΜSv/h and 0.06  cps 
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respectively  correspond to the expected 
specifications of a  closely  stacked array  of 30 
high-pressure (200 bar)  4He scintillation 
detector modules of 2”  outer  diameter  and 75 
cm  fiducial  length, with a  fiducial volume of 
approximately  one liter.  Prototype detectors of 
this technology  manufactured by  Arktis 
R a d i a t i o n  D e t e c t o r s L t d h a v e b e e n 
characterized and tested,7  including  the 
capability  of rejecting  1  mSv/h  of gamma 
radiation  from  a  60Co source. This exceeds the 
standard gamma  rejection of 0.1  mSv/h 
required for next generation portal monitors. 8
For  a  first  comparison,  the measurement 
time window  is chosen to be t=10  s. During 
this time,  Systems T  and F are expected to 
measure average backgrounds of Μt=30  and 
Μf=0.6  neutrons.  Using  (1), the thresholds kt 
and kf can  be computed for  given FAR 
requirements P. Considering that neutron 
nuisance alarms occur  within  10-4 of all 
measurements, 9 it  is sensible to require P to be 
substantially lower. 
Table I shows the obtained values for both 
systems compatible with  a  FAR requirement  of 
P=5 10-7.  The MDL values obtained with  (2) 
show  that the fast  neutron detection  system 
(System  F) is significantly  more sensitive to 
weak sources than  the thermal neutron 
detection  system  (System  T), in  spite of 
System T’s higher absolute sensitivity.
From  these calculations it  may  be 
concluded that unless background count rates 
are taken into account, absolute sensitivity  is 
an  inadequate measure for  performance 
comparison. MDL appears to be a  more 
suitable metric for comparison.
Variation of Parameters
In  an effort  to understand whether  the above 
comparison  depends strongly  on  the 
assumptions made for  measurement time t or 
FAR requirement  P,  these parameters can  be 
varied. Fixing  the measurement window  to 
t=10  s and varying the FAR requirement  has 
little impact  on  the relative performance of the 
two systems:
MDL for FAR<2 10-9 0.0091 µSv/h 0.0063 µSv/h
MDL for FAR<5 10-5 0.0058 µSv/h 0.0036 µSv/h
MDL for t=1 s 0.031 µSv/h 0.026 µSv/h
MDL for t=30 s 0.0041 µSv/h 0.0023 µSv/h
Whereas fixing  FAR<5 10-7 and varying the 
measurement  time has a  more substantial 
influence on the relative performances. 
A  shorter  measurement time shifts the 
balance more in  favor  of thermal neutron 
detection, a  longer  measurement time makes 
fast  neutron  detectors perform  better  in  such  a 
comparison. 
THE INFLUENCE OF SHIELDING
In  realistic scenarios, smuggled nuclear 
materials are  likely  to be shielded.  Therefore it 
is necessary  to understand the influence of 
shielding  on  fission neutron  spectra.  It  will be 
shown  that the intuitive assumption  that 
shielding  increases the slow  neutron  emission 
of a  source relative to the fast neutron 
emission  of the same source is incorrect in 
many cases.
Simulated Geometry
Using  GEANT4,10  the influence of different 
shielding  configurations on  neutron  emission 
was studied.  The simulated scenarios 
consisted of a  252Cf neutron source in  the 
center  of a  sphere of air  of 12.5  cm  radius, 
surrounded by  a  concentric  spherical shell of 
shielding, having  12.5  cm  inner  diameter,  see 
Figure 1.  Different  shielding materials 
including  polyethylene (PE), 5% borated 
polyethylene (borated PE), and Iron (Fe) were 
simulated in  radial  thicknesses ranging from 
12.5 cm to 100 cm. 
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Figure 1.  Geometry  used for simulation. A 252Cf  source 
is surrounded by  air and shielding of  thickness d in the 
shape of a spherical shell. 
From  the simulation  the total number  of 
neutrons escaping  the shielding  Ntot  was 
obtained.  This was compared to the number  of 
escaping  fast neutrons Nfast. Fig.  2  uses 
dashed lines to show  the dependence of the 
fast  neutron  fraction  Nfast/Ntot  on  shielding 
thickness for  the different  shielding  materials, 
where Nfast  is defined as the number  of 
escaping  neutrons with  an  energy  higher  than 
200 keV (and 100 keV, shown by solid lines). 
Results
The fractional values of neutrons above 
200keV  are high  for  PE and borated PE, 
materials often  commonly  selected for  neutron 
shielding  purposes.  This result may  be 
counter-intuitive, as hydrogenous shielding 
has the effect  of drastically  reducing  the 
energy  of all  neutrons that scatter  in  the 
shielding. The results can  however be 
explained by  assuming that  once scattered to 
low  energy,  neutrons have an increased chance 
of being  captured and thus never  escaping  the 
shielding. In  addition  the cross-section  for 
primary  interaction  of fast neutrons is reduced 
(“punch-through”).  The fast neutron  fraction 
is ~97% for  unshielded 252Cf (99%  above 100 
keV),  but quickly  drops if shielded by  thin 
(~10  cm) layers of hydrogenous shielding,  as 
would intuitively  be expected. For  thicker 
layers of shielding, however,  neutron 
absorption  in the shielding  becomes 
substantial,  continuously  depleting  the 
number  of slow  neutrons egressing with 
increasing  shielding thickness.  This inflection 
occurs at a smaller  radius for  borated than  for 
plain  polyethylene; and for  the polyethylene at 
a  smaller  radius than for  iron,  the latter  being 
a  poor  neutron shield11.  This behavior  is also 
observed by  Kouzes, et  al.,12  where a  similar 
simulation  using  MCNP was carried out, 
studying the relative populations at  energies 
below 1 eV and 1 keV.
Figure 2.  Plot shows what fraction of  the total number of 
neutrons egressing from a shielded 252Cf  source (See 
Fig.  1 for geometry) has an energy  above 200 keV. For 
example, 86% of  all neutrons egressing from a 252Cf 
source shielded by  borated polyethylene have an energy 
> 200 keV. 
75  cm  of borated polyethylene shielding 
a t t e n u a t e s 2 5 2 C f n e u t r o n  e m i s s i o n 
substantially,  to 2 10-4 of the original 
intensity.  In  many  cases, the egressing 
neutron intensity  from  such  a  heavily  shielded 
source may  be lower  than  the natural neutron 
background,  and thus very  difficult  to detect 
even  with  a  large number  of thermal neutron 
detectors.   Since the fast  neutron background 
is more than 50 times lower,  and the 
overwhelming  majority  of neutrons egressing 
are of high energy,  such  a  signature may  still 
be detectable by fast neutron detectors.
SCALABILITY 
Fast  neutron  detectors are inherently  more 
scalable than  thermal  neutron detectors and 
can  therefore be bundled into compact  arrays. 
Unlike thermal neutron  detectors,  they  do not 
suffer  substantial sensitivity  degradation 
effects.13  This geometry-dependent  effect is 
particularly  large when  several  thermal 
detectors are closely  packed. Depending  on 
technology, a  single  detector  panel contains 
1-5  thermal neutron  detectors within  the same 
moderator.  A full  portal monitor  typically 
consists of two to four  such  panels.  Figure 3 
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visualizes this effect, assuming  a  degradation 
factor of 1.7.
The fast  neutron detection  technology  used 
as a  basis for the calculations above has the 
further  advantage of being scalable also from  a 
cost  perspective,  since it  does not  rely  on 
expensive or  rare materials or  components. 
Figure 4 shows a prototype array.
Figure 3.  Visualization of  the different scaling behavior 
of  fast and thermal neutron detection systems, assuming 
a degradation factor of 1.7 for thermal neutron detectors. 
  
Figure 4.  Array of seven 4He detector modules. 
FALSE ALARM SUSCEPTIBILITY
While  false alarms arising  from  statistical 
background fluctuations have been  taken  into 
account above,  there are also further  potential 
sources of false alarms worth discussing.
 “Ship- Effect” Neutrons
Cosmic  spallation  can lead to neutron  bursts 
detected by  RPMs as spikes. Due to the 
production  mechanism  of such  neutrons, 
“ship-effect”  neutrons have the tendency  to 
arrive promptly, almost  simultaneously. The 
number  of false alarms arising  from  this effect 
can  be reduced by  means of time gating. 14 The 
time resolution  of thermal neutron  detectors is 
limited due to the process of neutron 
moderation,  therefore relatively  large time 
gates of 0.1  s are customary. Fast neutron 
detectors,  having  a  time resolution  of ~2  ns 
can  offer  shorter time gating windows,  thereby 
allowing  preciser  rejection  of ship-effect 
neutrons. 
Fast  neutron  detectors can  further  afford 
rejection of ship-effect  neutrons on  the basis 
of energy  whenever  the detected signal 
indicates a  neutron’s energy  to have been 
above those energies typical for  fission 
sources.
False Alarms from Misinterpreted 
Gamma Radiation
For  application  in  portal monitoring,  neutron 
detectors are required to have strong gamma 
rejection  capabilities, as misinterpreted 
gamma  counts can  lead to false alarms.  A 
standard requirement  is the rejection  of 0.1 
mSv/h of gamma  radiation from  60Co. 15  For 
most fast  neutron detection  technologies this 
is a challenge; even many  thermal neutrons 
can  only  achieve such  rejection  at the cost  of 
e f f ic iency . 16  Fast neutron  detect ion 
technologies based on pressurized 4He have 
demonstrated rejection  of up to 1  mSv/h 
without compromising efficiency.17
Other Potential Sources of False 
Alarms
Other  potential  sources of false alarms include 
microphonics, a  phenomenon  associated with 
most wire based ionization  detectors.  Similar 
problems also arise from  electromagnetic 
interference with  such  detectors.  The design 
described here is not  subjected to these 
problems.
CONCLUSIONS
In  summary, the following  conclusions can  be 
drawn:
1. Absolute sensitivity  is an inadequate 
metric  for  performance comparison,  as it 
does not  take into account the threshold 
requirements. MDL is a  more adequate 
performance metric.
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2. Fast  neutron  detectors can  achieve better 
MDL performance because they  are less 
affected by natural backgrounds.
3. Unshielded as well  as heavily  shielded 
sources emit mostly fast neutrons.
4. Fast  neutron  detection technologies are 
inherently  scalable. A  specific  fast neutron 
technology  is identified that  suggests 
scalability  both from  a  material  costs as 
well  as from  a  technical  feasibility  point  of 
view.
5. Fast  neutron detectors may  furthermore 
be less prone to false alarms arising  from 
phenomena  like ship-effect  neutrons, 
microphonics ,  or  e lectromagnet ic 
interference.
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